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W

e very much appreciate the time, effort, and
goodwill of all those responding to our article.
Each was generous with their feedback and insights,
and contributed to a meaningful dialogue centered on
tolerance. While we cannot respond to each commentator in depth, we will highlight and discuss a few of
the thought-provoking insights they raised.
Thank you to Hansen for bringing to our attention
that our phrasing and use words can have philosophical ramifications. As Hansen points out, our use of
the term without when we say “accepting and respecting the person, and being responsible to them without
being concerned about the beliefs they hold,” could
signal a certain laissez-fare attitude towards moral
questions. To clarify what we meant, we suggest that
our responsibility is to lovingly engage a person’s divine nature, without stipulations requiring certain
moral stances to be eligible for our love.
In response to Hansen’s concern about the client potentially being responsible for the therapist, we suggest
a more finely nuanced look at our ethical relationship
to others. Responsibility to the other (Other) can be
visualized as being asymmetrical—extending outward
from the self towards another. This asymmetry does
not necessarily require that it be omni-directional at all
moments. Ideally, the therapist would live that responsibility for the client as the client lives it for others in
their life. At times it may turn towards the therapist,
but that is neither necessary nor constant. Nor is it

necessarily in the same form and intensity as the therapist is showing the client. At some level, the client does
bear a responsibility for the therapist, just as they do
for any other being. Recognizing that and processing
that experience might be therapeutic in its own right.
A relational approach to psychotherapy does not diminish the reality of the power differential in psychotherapy or the vulnerability of clients. In some ways it
enhances one’s sensitivity to those realities.
Young brought up the important issue of healthy
boundaries. What happens when one person in a relationship is trying to live the ethical call, and the other has no intention to heed the call. How do we avoid
raising martyrs to the other? This is once again a place
where a close look at the nature of this responsibility can help. The responsibility towards another is an
ethical relationship calling us to act ethically towards
others. We can, therefore, ask whether allowing another to act selfishly or manipulatively is the most ethical
course of action and response. A simplified example
of this comes in the form of parent child interactions.
While we are not implying that children are inherently selfish or manipulative, children are apt to express
needs and demands to parents that are not in their
best interest. Would we consider a parent to be acting
ethically if they honor their child’s request to never go
to sleep, or play with a matchbox, or forcefully take
toys away from other children? Ethical responsibility
to others require vision of what a person truly needs.
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Our responsibility is to consider how to best love the
other, which often requires us to establish limits, contradict, or even distance ourselves from the other.
Fischer set out to apply the new definition of tolerance to human/moral development. In applying
developmental notions to our ideas, Fischer suggests
that we “become new creatures” in the process. While
we agree with this notion in some ways, this becoming
is not something sought or developed. Rather it is a
resignation to a reality—a reality that is prior even to
ourselves as selves. Fischer raises another issue which
we don’t really address in the paper. The question of
whether we can really know, really understand one another’s pain. Individualism seems not to allow for this.
A radical relationism seems to allow for it, and maybe
even require it. This is a critical question for those
in the helping professions. Some would argue we can
only know another’s pain if we have experienced similar pain. We suggest that because we are not really
separate from one another in the first place, we can,
in fact know another’s experience—even if we haven’t
had such an experience ourselves.
We appreciate Gee’s wonderful exposition on the
changes in the meaning of tolerance over the ages. We
agree with Gee’s citations showing that grounding tolerance in a relativistic view of truth has counter-productive consequences. While we did not explore the
full etymology of the word tolerance, that was not our
overall purpose. Technically correct or not, we used
a definition that matches the meaning of the word in
the common vernacular. The comparison between
tolerance and charity (as informed by LDS scripture)
adds an important piece to the dialogue on tolerance.
We would add that the definition of tolerance that we
put forth is inherently tied to a very important judgement: the judgment that I deem this person I am engaged with as worthy, to respond to their divine nature
before all else.
Gee illustrates the difficulty of overcoming the individualism inherent in so much of our language and
culture. For example, his proposal that charity and
tolerance are mutually exclusive depends on individualistic definitions of both. In saying, “Charity begins
with judging and being able to discern good from evil,”
he presumes that individuals are the fundamental
reality and that these individuals make independent
judgments and that these judgments can be tempered

by an individualistic sort of charity. For us, if you start
with the assumptions of individualism, it is difficult to
come to any sort of charity (or tolerance or judgment
for that matter) that is either Christian or meaningful.
Consider three statements by Oliver (2001) and how
they might inform this discussion:
To see oneself as a subject and to see other people as
the other or the objects not only alienates one from
those around him or her but also enables the dehumanization inherent in oppression and domination.
(p. 3)

What we are suggesting is that tolerance, as typically
understood among therapist-types, is too often used
to mean the endurance of those alien to oneself. Accordingly one could be objectifying, dehumanizing,
judging and still be tolerant.
Only if we imagine ourselves cut off from others and
the world around us do we need to create elaborate
schemes for bridging the gap. We create an impossible
problem for ourselves by presuming to be separate in
the first place. (p. 12)

By using judgment as the starting point for our engagement with others we create an impossible (albeit
imaginary) gap between ourselves and others. This
gap precludes the kind of charity, or tolerance, that we
suggest should precede any sort of judgment.
How can a unified, self-contained being ever come
in contact with something or someone wholly other
to itself? If the self is bounded and experiences only
that which is within its boundaries, then how can it encounter anything outside of its own boundaries? (p. 2)

The ultimate danger in individualism is that it precludes any real knowledge of the other. Because the
other is separate and foreign, I cannot know them.
And we would argue, because we cannot really know
them, we can neither love them nor righteously judge
them.
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